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In the Supreme Court
of the State of U tab

EAST COAST DISCOUNT CORPORATION,
a Corporation,
Respondent,
vs.
BRYCE REYNOLDS and DARWIN NEUENSCHWANDER, d/b/a REYNOLDS
SAND & GRAVEL COMPANY, a copartnership and BRYCE REYNOLDS and
DARWIN NEUENSCHWANDER, lndi-

Case
No. 8693

Appellants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On September 22nd, 1952, the Appellants signed a written
contract with the Carbozite Protective Coatings Inc. by its
representative, N. Newman, (Tr. 52) whereby the Appellants
were granted the exclusive right to sell the products of the said
Carbozite Protective Coatings Inc. in the Town of Sandy and
Trading Area. The merchandise ordered in the contract was
3
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shipped to the defendants but not paid for by them at the time.
At a later date another representative of the Carbozite Protective Coatings Inc., came to defendants and advised them
they had to have additional merchandise in order to proceed
with their sales and make their demonstrations. At that time
six trade acceptances were presented to the defendants which
were signed by the defendants and the merchandise accordingly
shipped to them by the Carbozite Protective Coatings Inc.,
but the trade acceptances were not paid by defendants. In view
of this case being decided at the pre-trial of the case, there was
no testimony given for reasons of not paying the trade acceptances, but the facts are, that the defendants had a defense for
non payment of these trade acceptances, as outlined in their
answer to the complaint of the plaintiff (Tr. 10).
That before maturity, as alleged in plaintiff's complaint,
these trade acceptances were negotiated by the Carbozite Protective Coatings to the plaintiff herein, ( T r. 8-9), and suit
was instituted by the plaintiff as assignor or purchasers of
these trade acceptances, against the defendants and the case
being at issue was called for pretrial.
At the pre-trial, the contract between the Carbozite Protective Coatings Inc. and the defendants was introduced in
evidence (Exhibit 1, Tr .52). An informal discussion was had
between the court and the respective attorneys for the parties
to the action. In view of the fact that the suit was instituted by
the Assignee of the Carbozite Protective Coatings Inc., as
holders in due course, the defense of defendants to the original
contract between themselves and the Carbozite Protective
Coatings Inc. would be excluded under rules of evidence,
4
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therefore the defendants had to rely upon the defense that the
Carbozite Protective Coatings was a foreign corporation doing business in the State of Utah, without complying with
the provisions of Chapter 8, paragraphs 16-8-1-2-3-Utah Code
Annotated 195 3.
The court considered the contract and asked defendant's
.:.ttorney if that was the only defense, or if other evidence
could be introduced to show that the Carbozite Proective
Coatings Inc., was doing business in the State of Utah without
complying with the provisions of the Code. The reply was
by the defendant's attorney that one other such contract could
be introduced as evidence that said Carbozite Protective Coatings Inc., was dealing with another party and that was all of
the evidence the defendants could produce at that time. The
provisions of the contract was dismissed by the court and the
attorneys for the respective parties, and the matter was taken
under advisement and continued to a further date for further
consideration thereof. At the next hearing on the pre-trial,
the court after considering the matter, entertained a motion
for judgment on the part of the plaintiff and the judgment
was accordingly entered in favor of the plaintiff and against
the defendants on the 2nd day of January, 1957 (Tr. 4142-53). No findings or conclusions of law apparently were
filed.
Within the time allowed by law, and on or about the
lt1h day of January, 1957 the defendants filed a motion for
a new trial supported by affidavits. The motion was based
upon the statutory grounds of newly discovered evidence that
could not have been reasonably produced at the hearing of

5
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the pre-trial, setting forth the facts that the defendants by
mere chance had discovered a continuation of business activities
of the Carbozite Protective Coatings Inc., in the State of Utah.
Additional affidavit of the defendants certified that defendants
had by chance discovered some twenty-two additional parties
that the said Carbozite Protective Coatings Inc. had done
business with under identical or similar circumstances they
had done business with the defendants, which evidence could
not have been produced as evidence at the original hearing
or pre-trial, as disclosed by said affidavits of the defendants
jn support of its motion and its amended motion for a new
trial (Tr. 44-45-46-47-48-49). The court took the motion under
advisement and permitted defendants to file a brief thereon.
After the brief was filed and consideration given thereto the
court denied the motion for a new trial and defendants now
appeal to this court.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT ONE
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE MOTION
OF THE PLAINTIFF FOR JUDGMENT AT THE PRETRIAL OF SAID CAUSE, IN fAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF
AND AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS.

POINT TWO
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION
OF THE DEFENDANTS FOR A NEW TRIAL BASED
UPON NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE WHICH
6
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COULD NOT REASONABLY BE PRODUCED BY THE
DEFENDANTS AT THE TIME OF THE PRE-TRIAL OF
SAID MATTER.

ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE MOTION
OF THE PLAINTIFF FOR JUDGMENT AT THE PRETRIAL OF SAID CAUSE, IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF
AND AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS.
The judgment in this case in favor of the plaintiff and
:1gainst the defendants apparently was decided by the court
solely upon the theory that the plaintiff's assignor, the Carbozite Protective Coatings Inc. was soliciting business and selling
merchandise in interstate transactions. At least that is the only
conclusion that can be drawn by reason of lack of findings
of fact and conclusions of law lacking in this matter and the
further failure of the court to enter a pre-trial order setting
forth its reasonings or conclusions upon which judgment was
entered herein.
The court apparently overlooked the provisions of the contract entered into by and between the defendants and the plaintiff's assignor, Carbozite Protective Coatings Inc., by failing
to take into consideration the provisions of said contract with
respect to what said corporation was to do in assisting the
defendants to market its products, among which were certain
§ circulations of its advertisements; advertising in local papers,
J(
sending a representative of said company to assist the defend7
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<!.nts in making contact with prospective customers and instructmg the defendants in the application and sale of said products.
The contract was signed and accepted in behalf of said corporation by its authorized agent and the contract was consummated and closed in the State of Utah without having to
be approved by any other representative of said company.
The trade acceptances upon which this suit is based, having
been assigned to the plaintiff herein, before the due date, and
the plaintiff being a holder in due course, it is presumably
the law that any defeense the defendants may have to a breach
of the contract entered into by the plaintiff's assignor and the
defendants would be, according to the rules of evidence, cut
off. This resolves the matter down to whether the Carbozite
Protective Coatings Inc., was doing business as a foreign corporation in the State of Utah, without having complied with
the laws of the State of Utah, as provided by Sections 8-1-2-3
U.C.A. 1953. If they were doing business as defined by that
statute and the court so determined they were doing business,
then such a contract is void as to all subsequent holders, in
due course or otherwise. We will therefore confine this point
of our argument to that question.
The defendants are well aware of the fact that this court
has decided that isolated transactions by such a corporation
in the State of Utah is not doing business within the contemplation of the statute, or that interstate transactions by such
a corporation is doing doing business, but this court and other
courts have likewise decided that a continuation of such trans·
actions could readily be construed as doing business in the
state.
8
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

We respectively submit to the court the provisions of the
contract between the Carbozite Protective Coatings Inc., and
the defendants as follows:
"POWER OF ATTORNEY: The Dealer is hereby
given Power of Attorney to replace any material necessary to his customers, in accordance with the terms of
the Guaranty and the Company will replace to him free
of charge replacements made by the Dealer."
While this power of attorney is limited, it nevertheless
authorized and directs the dealer to act for and in behalf of
the Corportaion and to perform in behalf of the Corporation
local acts in furtherance of its business.
"ADVERTISING: The Dealer will submit a list up
to 200 names of commercial, home or farm property
owners in his territory, on the Company's form, which
will be circularized in his behalf by the company at
their expense, enclosing therein a return request for
samples, addressed to the Dealer."
The Company will circularize these forms in behalf of the
dealer by the Company at their expense. Another local actiyity
on the part of the Company constituting doing business in the
state pursuant to decisions of the court hereinafter referred to.
If a corporation cannot do these local acts by reason of the
prohibition of the statute directly, they cannot do this indirectly by merely constituting, or naming its agent as a dealer.
"NEWSPAPER ADVERTISING: The Company
will share with the Dealer fifty-fifty in the cost of newspaper advertising. Mats for this purpose will be supplied by the Company, gratis, upon request."
Another local act to be performed by the company through
its agents, called the dealer. Even supplying the advertising.
9
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"SALES COOPERATION: Upon the written request
of the Dealer and at a date mutually agreed upon, or
at an earlier date if the Company can arra~ge it, the
Company will send a representative at theu e~pense
to make calls with the Dealer or his representative on
any prospects he may have at the time of such visit."
As additional act of a local nature, sending its own agents
into the State to make such sales, by using the Dealer as a
subterfuge. This is all in furtherance of selling its products
in the state. The mere fact that the Company attempts to use
the dealer in this manner does not do away with the fact
that the company is actually making its sales in the state, without being subject to taxation, licenses and other regulations
of the law pertaining to doing business in the state, in competition with local corporations who are subject to such
regulations.
The foregoing provision of this contract is going beyond
the decisions of the courts, wherein the courts have held that
certain sales are in interstate commerce and in support of this
let us consider the following authorities:
McGriff v. Charles Antell, Inc., 256 P.2nd 703, Utah.
"In determining whether a foreign corporation is
doing business in a State for jurisdictional purposes,
each case factually must be examined as it arises. A
hard and fast formula cannot determine every case.
Common sense must dictate the result."
Normandie Oil Corp. v. Oil Trading Co., 163 S.\\r. 2nd 179.
"And where a non-resident corporation performs
an act of local nature even when that act is part of
a contract for the sale of goods in interstate commerce,
10
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the act is intrastate, and is subject to regulation by the
State. 246 U. S. 500, 142 S. W. 1157."
Merchant v. National Reserve Co. of America, 137 Pac. 2nd
332, Utah.
"The constitution applies to all Corporations. In our
opinion the constitution reasonably contstrued, was intended to prohibit corporations from transacting their
ordinary corporate business within the state without
first complying with its terms-and was not intended
or designed to prohibit the doing of one single act of
business by such foreign corporation with no apparent
intention to do any other act, or to engage in corporate

business.
The general conclusions of the courts is that isolated
transactions, commercial or otherwise, taking place between a foreign corporation domiciled in one state and
citizens of another state, are not a doing or carrying on
of business by the foreign corporation within the latter
state, but that these prohibitions are leveled against
the act of foreign corporations entering the domestic
state by their agents, and engaging in the general prosecution of their ordinary business therein.
In Booth & Co. v. Weigand, 83 Pac. 734 (Utah)
discussing the above statutory and constitutional provisions, the court said: "The words doing business, as
used in these provisions, refer to a general transaction
of business, and not to an isolated transaction, or to
a single or wholly collateral acts. The statute obviously
relates to some regular or customary business." Citing
certain cases therein the court further says: "The question now presented is, What is meant by transacting
business? The best definition we can think of for this
phrase is the doing or performing a series of acts
which occupy the time, attention, and labor of men for
the purpose of livelihood, profit, or pleasure. It is well
11
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established upon authority that doing of a si~gle a_ct
pertaining to a particular business or tr~nsactwn ':111
not be considered carrying on, transactmg or domg
business. The mere term itself implies more than one
transaction.''

"If in fact the corporation is here, if it is here, not
occasionally or casually, but with a fair measure of permanence and continuity, then, whether its business is
interstate or local, is within the jurisdiction of our
courts . . . But there is no precise test of the nature
or extent of the business that must be done. All that
is required is that enough be done to say that the corporation is here. As was said in International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U. S. 579, each case must
depend upon its own facts."
It is thus apparent that it is not any activity of a corporation in a state other than its residence which will
justify the conclusion that it is doing business there
. . . but it is the combination of local activities conducted by such foreign corporation, their manner, extent and character, which becomes determinative of the
jurisdiction question.

Isolated transactions do not constitute a doing business within the meaning of the statute; it contemplates
a more or less continuing course of business.
Normandie Oil Corp. v. Oil Trading Co., 163 S.W. 2nd 179
(Texas).
"When a non-resident corporation performs an act
of a local nature even when that act is part of a contract for the sale of goods in interstate commerce, the
act is intrastate, and is subject to regulation by the
State. 246 U.S. 500, 142 S. W. 1157.
Haggerty v. National Fura nd Tanning Co., 162 N.W. 1068,
(Minn.)
12
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Foreign corporation sends agents into Minn. to
solicit business and make contracts. A dispute arose
out of a failure to fulfill the contract and a resident
filed action serving one of these salesmen. The defendant corporation contends it is not doing business in
the state and the service on the salesman not binding
on the corporation, the court said:
"From the correspondence between the parties it
clearly appears that these traveling agents had authority to make tentative contracts in this state, defendant
only reserving the right to pass on the sufficiency of
the estimate of price for work made by the agent. From
the receipts given and the contract made by the agent
in this instance apparently ratified by the manager,
the agent seemed to have full authority to close the
contract. The transaction with plaintiff cannot be regarded as the only business done by the defendant in
this state.
We must infer that such transactions were numerous
from the fact that these traveling salesmen must have
subsisted on the commission earned, there being no
suggestions that they had any other means of support.
We do not, however, apprehend that the volume of
business is at all material, nor in what manner it is
done, nor how those who transact the same for defendant were compensated. The fact remains defendant
was doing business when it sent its traveling salesman
into this state and when, in August 1915, plaintiff at
Farmont made her contract, with one of them and delivered to him her coat. It apparently was pursuing the
same business when on September 1916, it sent another
of its traveling salesmen to her residence with the
garment to adjust the claimed liability upon this contract. Penn Lumbermens Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Meyers,
197 U. S. 407. A fire insurance company which issues
policies upon real estate, and personal property situated
in another state is as much engaged in its business when

13
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agents are there under authority adjusting ~he los~es,
covered by its policies as it is when engaged 1n makmg
contracts to take such risks."
Irons v. Simeon L. & George H. Rogers, 166 Fed. 781.
··I do not understand that the N. Y. representative
merely transacts offers to buy goods to the Connecticut
Factory where the defendant decides whether it will
accept or reject them, but that such representative makes
binding contracts with purchasers, and sends to Connecticut merely directions where to ship the goods.
If this be so, the case is similar to Cone v. Tuscaloose
Mfg. Co., 76 Fed. 891, and the motion is denied. If
the defendant believes it can show that the agent is
merely soliciting who has no power to contract, and
will pay the expense of the hearing before a master
to establish that fact, an order of reference will be
made."
Priggs v. Selz Schwab & Co., 138 N.W. 975.
"Defendant is an Illinois Corporation which manufactures shoes and sells them to retail dealers. It also
arranges for the operation in various localities of what
are known as Sels Royal Blue Stores. When an arrangement is made to operate one of these stores, defendant
enters into a contract with the dealer which provides
that the store shall be known and advertised as the
dealer's Sels Royal Blue Shoes, etc. . . . We think
defendant was doing business in this state and that
such service was valid under the rule established in
the following and similar cases: 151 N. W. 917; 152
N. W. 410; 234 U.S. 579.
International Harvester Co. v. Commonwealth of Kentucky,
234 Fed. 579.
"W~en a corporation of one state goes into another, m order to be regarded as within the latter it

14
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must be there by its agents authorized to transact business in that state . . . each case must depend upon
its own facts, and there consideration must show that
this essential requirement of jurisdiction has been complied with, and that the corporation is actually doing
business within the state. Here was a continuous course
of business in the solicitation of orders which were sent
to another state, and in response to which the machines of the International Harvester were delivered
within the state of Kentucky. This was a course of
business, not a single transaction. The agents not only
solicited such orders in Kentucky, but might there
receive payment in money, checks, or drafts. They might
take notes of customers which notes were made payable,
and doubtless were collected at any bank in Kentucky.
This course of conduct of authorized agents within the
state in our judgment constituted a doing of business
where in such wise that the Harvester Co. might be
fairly said to have been there doing business and
amenable to process of the courts of that State."
I respectfully submit to the court that the foregoing case,
pertaining to the facts, is identical with the case now before the
court, but the case now before the court is of a stronger nature.
The Carbozite Protective Coatings Inc., not only took notes
of its customers, commonly called "trade acceptances" payable
at any bank in Utah on which it was sent through, but the
company agreed by its contract to do acts of a local nature as
outlined by the contract and heretofore set forth hereinabove.
Actinoo Laboratories, Inc., v. Lamb, 278 N.W. 234 (Iowa).
"The order for the sale of the machine in question
expressly provides that it was not subject to countermand or recission. The order contained no limitation
that it was subject to acceptance. The order contained
no limitation that it was subject to acceptance or ap-

15
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proval by the Company in Chicago, nor was any t~sti
mony offered tending to show any such understanding.
On the contrary, all of the evidence points to but one
conclusion and that is that the contract of sale was
execuetd a~d accepted by the president of t?e plaintiff
company and machine delivered in the Ctty of Des
Moines, Iowa, by Dr. Loeb. The evidence shows that
plaintiff was doing business in the State of Iowa and
the facts in this case bring it squarely within the prohibition of our statute."
Imperial Curtain Co. v. Jacobs, 127 N.W. 772 (Michigan).
"Held that where plaintiff, a foreign corporation not
having complied with the laws of Michigan, procured
an advertising contract through traveling salesman
from defendants, to be performed in Michigan by the
insertion of defendant's advertisement on a drop curtain in a theatre, the plaintiff in performance of the
contract, prepared an advertisement in Philadelphia
and shipped it to Detroit where it was placed on a curtain, such contract related to business of a purely local
nature not amounting to interstate commerce, and was
therefore unenforceable.''
LaPorte Heinekamp Motor Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 24 Fed. 2d
861.

"That which the agent of the defendant did in Maryland was soliciting of business, and something more.
It is well settled that solicitation alone is insufficient
to constitute doing business in a technical sense. Green
V. C. B. & 0. Ry., 205 U. S. 530. On the other hand it
has been held that where there is a continuous course
of business in solicitation of orders by a foreign corporation, which were sent to another state, and in response to which goods of hte corporation were delivered within the state, and the agent not only solicited orders in money, checks, or drafts and took the
notes of customers, payable and collectible at banks
16
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

within the State, there was a doing business which
would subject the corporation to suit within the State.
234. U. S. 579, 3 Fed. 2d 520.
Colorado Iron Works v. Eierra Grand Mining Co., 25 Pac. 325.
"On the contrary I think justice requires that they
shall be subject to the action of the courts of the state
whose comity they thus invoke. For the purpose of being sued, they ought in such cases to be regarded as
voluntarily placing themselves in the situation of citizens of that state. Any nautral person who goes into
another state carries along with him all his personal
liability; and there is quite as much reason that a corporation which chooses to open an office and transact
its busines, or to authorize contracts to be made in another state, should be regarded as thereby voluntarily
submitting itself to the action of the laws of that state,
as well in reference to the mode of commencing suits
against it as to the interpretation of the contracts so
made.
It must be regarded as the settled law of this state
that, if a corporation makes a contract in a state other
than that in which it was chartered, it thereby submits
itself to the jurisdiction of such foreign sovereignty so
far as to be liable therein in regard to that contract
when summoned according to the laws of the state.
(Citing other cases) where the same general principles
are recognized and asserted; and the same may be said
of the courts of the states and that in England the same
jurisdiction is asserted over foreign corporations."

John Deere Plow Co. v. My land et al., 76 Pac. 863 (Kansas)

1·

1

~

(Suit on a promissory note for merchandise purchased.) "Although the record in each case discloses but
one transaction of the corporation that transaction wa~
not merely incidental or casual. It was part of th~::
very business to perform which the corporation existed
17
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It did distinctly indicate a purpose on the part of the
corporation to engage in business within the. State, and
to make Kansas a part of its field of op~rat10n, where
a substantial part of its ordinary traffte was. to be
carried on. Therefore, although a single act? t~ constituted a doing of business in the state wtthm the
meaning of the Statute."

There are numerous cases which reach the same conclu~ions of those set forth hereinabove but we think the foregoing
is a fair example of what the law is, and to cite others would
be merely accumulative.
It may be concluded or assumed that the court in deciding
this case in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant,
the court labored under the presumption tha this was an isolated
transaction inasmuch as defendants could not at the time produce more than two instances of such contract solicited in
Utah, at that time, due to lack of obtaining other evidence and
that such was a mere solicitation which some courts have
decided is in interstate commerce, but the court utterly failed
to take into consideration the obligations on the part of the
plaintiff's assignor to perform acts of purely a local nature and
performing acts and duties which take this case out of the realm
of purely solicitation. Even though this may be considered
as an isolated transaction of one or two contracts, it surely
comes within the meaning of the law as outlined in the cases
hereinabove set forth. We must assume that the court in
deciding this case on pre-trial took this attitude in view of
the fact that the court failed to make a pre-trial order herein
or failed to make and file findings of facts and conclusions
of law.

18
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POINT TWO
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION
OF THE DEFENDANTS FOR A NEW TRIAL BASED
UPON NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE WHICH
COULD NOT REASONABLY BE PRODUCED BY THE
DEFENDANTS AT THE TIME OF THE PRE-TRIAL OF
SAID MATTER.
Within the time prescribed by the rules of Civil Procedure the plaintiffs filed a motion for a new trial based upon
the grounds: "Newly discovered evidence, material for the
party making the application, which they could not, with
reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the
trail." This motion and its amendments were supported by
,iJfidavits of the plaintiff disclosing why such evidence could
not be produced at the pre-trial or at the trial of the case
had a trial been permitted. (Tr. 44-45-46-47-48-49).
The discovery of this evidence, as shown by the affidavits
of one of the defendants shows that the additional evidence,
which defendant desired to produce was discovered purely by
accidental means and that he diligently pursued the lead that
he obtained, and by diligently pursuing this lead he discovered
that the plaintiff's assignor, the Carbozite Protective Coatings
Inc., had been procuring these contracts from numerous parties
within the state of Utah and other states over several years
r by its agents, and its pursuit of business and activities were
practically the same in each case. Had the defendants been
granted a new trial, this evidence could have been readily
produced to show that the case now before the court was not
c:n isolated transaction but a continuity of business in the state
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on the part of this corporation. Defendants could have produced evidence to show that the Carbozite Protective Coatings
Inc., had stored some of its merchandise in a warehouse in
Salt Lake City, Utah, and was carrying on an active business
within the state. To deny the defendants' motion for a new
trial was depriving the defendants of their day in court and
It was error on the part of the court to reach such a decision
based merely upon a conclusion.
At a continuation of the hearing of the pre-trial date, the
defendant appeared in court to testify of his diligence in procuring the evidence that he wished to produce at the trial,
in support of his affidavit and how he accidentally discovered
the additional evidence, which he could not have done with
ciue diligence before this pre-trial, or the trial of the case had
(I trial been had, but apparently the court concluded from the
discussion had at the pre-trial that such evidence would not
be material, when in fact it would show a continued business
activity on the part of the plaintiff's assignor within the State
of Utah. See discussoin at the pre-trial (Tr. 33-34-34¥2·3536-37) . I am assuming the court concluded this which should
probably have been shown by a pre-trial order and filing of
findings of act and conclusions of law, which are lacking in
the case. Defendant was not permitted to testify in support of
his affidavit for a new trial. This, in our opinion, was an abuse
of discretion of the court.
Jensen vs. Logan City, 57 Pac. 2d 708 at 723 (Utah).
'·w~ere

disinterested test~mony on the vital point in

a case 1s very scant, newly dtscovered testimony on that

point appearing from affidavits in support of the mo20
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tion for a new trial to be apparently reliable, when it
appears that the movant for the new trial was not
guilty of indiligence in failing to obtain the witness
for the trial, and that there is no element of holding
such witness in reserve for purposes of obtaining a
new trial - generally picturesquely denominated in
slang phraseology as "an ace in the hole"-and it
appears likely that such evidence would change the
result, a new trial should be granted. While the granting or refusing of the motion lies in the sound discretion of the court, where there is grave suspicion
that justice may have miscarried because of the lack
of enlightenment on a vital point which new evidence
will apparently supply, and the other elements attendant on obtaining a new trial on the grounds of newly
discovered evidence are present, it would be an abuse
of sound discretion not to grant the same."
CONCLUSION
The appellant respectfully submits:
(a) That plaintiff's assignor, the Carbozite Protective
Coatings, Inc., was and is presently doing business in the
State of Utah as a foreign corporation not authorized to do
business within this state. It was stipulated by counsel for
respondent that said Carbozite Protective Coatings Inc., was
a foreign corporation not qualifying to do business in Utah.
(Tr. 24).
(b) The contract itself, Exhibit "A" (Tr. 52), requues
the said corporation to perform acts of purely local nature,
t~dvertising, furnishing advertising material for its jobbers;
agreeing to send representatives into the state to assist in the
sale af its merchandise.
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(c) Taking notes of its jobbers, (trade aceptances) whid
are payable and collectable in local banks.
(d) Entering into contracts within the stateof Utah by
its duly authorized agents, then violating the provisions of
said contracts, then assigning its contracts to third parties, who
apparently are holders in due course, for the purpose of suit
and evasions of its obligations, or preventing defendants from
asserting their defense thereto, without having to go to the
expense of suing thereon in the home state of said corporation.
(e) If each case is to be decided upon its own facts, as
decided by our Supreme Court and other states, I respectfully
~ubmit that the facts of the case now before the court dearly
falls within the preview of the cases in their brief submitted,
and the court should find that the said Carbozite Protective
Coatings Inc., the plaintiff's assignor, is doing business within
the State of Utah, and their contracts should be held void by
reason of the statute of the State of Utah made and provided
in such cases.
(f) That the court abused its discretion in denying the
Jefendants' motion for a new trial to produce newly discovered
evidence which could not be produced at the time of the pre·
trial with diligence on the part of the defendants, to show a
continued business on the part of the plaintiff's assignor within
the state of Utah and elsewhere.
Respectfully submitted,

BENJAMIN SPENCE
Appellant's Attorney
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